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Lawrence Kimmel
The Mythic Journey of a Changeling
Once upon a time, there was a creature that crawled out of the sea and…
Once upon a time, there was a creature made perfect who met a serpent in a garden and…
Once upon a time, there were heroic creatures on earth that strove against the gods and…

There are many such tales in the archaic moorings of our collective memory, but
one in particular that seems inclusive if indeterminate: Once upon a time there was a
creature that came out of the darkness with a only a faint memory of water, and sand, and
cold, and fear to discover that its very life depended on telling a story about its origins—
of which it had no clear memory, and its destiny—of which it had no certain knowledge.
What more fabulous to conceive than this creature which, having lost its tail, dreams of
growing wings? It is a being whose nature transforms itself and the world it inhabits but,
for all this, keeps running up against its own limits: neither Ape nor Angel, it remains a
creature caught between, looking through a fractured mirror at possibilities always just
beyond reach. It is a changeling creature, a child seeming stolen from the gods.
I
Historical fantasies in language and life: The nature and reach of language has
been variously construed by philosophers with only a common acknowledgement that it
is the single instrument we have toward a comprehensive critical discernment of life and
world. It remains a critical issue, however, whether the entire range of meaning can and
should be used in comprehending truth and reality. It may be well to clarify at the outset
the difference in these two questions. Truth has many forms, indeed truth is a matter of
form. Reality, on the other hand, however and wherever manifest, is a matter of flow
rather than form. Its modality is one of continual transformation. If the limits of our

world are the limits of our language, then it makes a world of difference if we confine our
language to facts. Even the most fundamental forms of knowledge in science are
discontinuous and subject to paradigm shifts, but reality is itself formless and suffers no
such fixations. Inquiries concerning truth invariably require a calculus of language with
an abridgment of meaning, but if we move from the question of what is true to what is
real there can be no final abridgement of language and no abstractions into a calculus.
The world of reality unlike the world of truth refers to the whole of what is possible—that
is, to whatever is meaningful within the range and sense of language.
In ancient classical philosophy the long standing ‗quarrel‘ that Plato alludes to
between literature and philosophy is framed in many different ways, most particularly as
that between mythos and logos. It has an historical sequel in the divide between Plato‘s
rejection of the value of rhetorical discourse and its reinstatement by Aristotle. Two
philosophers in the modern period have similarly commented on a kind of conceptual
schism in the relation of language and world: With regard to Nietzsche‘s rhetorical claim
that there are no facts, only interpretations, Wittgenstein offered the logical corrective
that not everything can be an interpretation.
While these seem to be contradictory claims (as Wittgenstein so intended in his
reminder to Nietzsche) they can also be regarded as compatible remarks about and within
the world of sense and meaning. Interpretations can only be interpretations of something,
of course, but that something can be other than a fact—e.g. it may be an assumption or
postulate, or else be grounded in a social or existential commitment unrelated to a factual
claim. The point here is that to call something a fact whether in common sense or
science, is to give it a value, or accept it as constituted by a value. The world is not
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reducible to facts in the absence of some determining structure of agreement as to what
will count as a fact. In scientific discourse and practice this is commonly expressed as
‗all observations are theory laden‘ with the general implication that all seeing is ‗seeing
as…‘ To put it differently, no intelligible world—including that of physics—consists in a
totality of facts. The world in which we live is not made up simply of things, nor is it
comprehended by facts: facts are not the building blocks of meaning, only one of its
potential attributes which in turn requires interpretation. To put the matter in terms other
than interpretation and as it will be addressed in this essay: the world in which we live is
meaningful in terms of the stories that we tell, stories that we share, stories we remember
and stories that we live. Stories and the lives they embrace are neither constituted nor
limited by an independent description of facts. They are formed and edited in terms of
the perspectives and interpretations we bring to the experiences we share.
Aristotle‘s indelible inscription in the bedrock of western thought—that Man is a
creature with Logos—is a point of departure and a point directly in question concerning
the issue historical fabulation. In the specific context and currency of his time Aristotle‘s
definition focused on the rational discourse of self governance so that his original claim
split into the memorialized definition that as a possessor of Logos or speech, Man is a
rational and a political animal. These two features of Logos are of course the result of an
interpretation of a founding claim that intellectual history has since adopted as the
defining capacity of human-being. So understood it has the effect of restricting the
cognitive limits of language to discursive reason.
But another interpretation can and has been given to ‗Man is a creature with
Logos‘ (words/ speech/ language) that does not center in logic nor serve the narrow limits

3

of control in reason and rule. As a creature with Logos, Man is understood as having the
capacity to tell stories—that is, as an alternative to Aristotle‘s governing definition, Man
is a story-telling animal. Man is a creature graced not only in a faculty needed to reason
and govern, but able to put her life and experience into stories. The stories we live by are
legion—collectively they comprise the different human concerns investigated by religion,
history, philosophy, biology, economics… Within each of these collective accounts the
dominant interpretation in western intellectual and political history has been that of rule
and reason, logic and legislation—that is, it has biased Aristotle‘s interpretation of Logos.
This bias has tended to establish and direct the central use of language to that of
control—of the environment, of the world, of others, of ourselves. Such a bias in
philosophical terms represents an ambition to reduce meaningful discourse to the
category of facts and so use language (Logos) to constrain the myriad possibilities of
imagination toward a matrix of control. This project was made explicit in logical
positivism but it is residual as well in the general culture.
It is instructive to consider what a shared life-world would become if it were
reduced to a discourse of facts, in which no stories are told, or rather, just one story, the
recounting of facts according to the master narrative in which all facts are given or from
which they are derived. As a case in point, and reflective of a dominant male culture still
in keeping with the Classical Greek bias, the traditional form of autobiography has been
that of factual summary. In Lionel Trilling‘s wonderful story about college teaching, Of
This Time, Of that Place…, a class of first year students is assigned to write an initial
essay about who they are and why they have come to the college. The responses all take
the form: ‗My name is James Bierbower III. I was born on…in…and went to school
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at…my father, James Bierbower II and his father… were born and raised…‘ –a series of
related facts and events that frame the endowed life of an entitled class at a small liberal
arts college. The one exception to this litany of sameness is a student who begins his
essay by seeming to reject the essay question: ‗Of this time, of that place, of some
heritage… what does that matter to those of us now engaged in the creative adventure of
learning…?‘ It turns out, of course, that it does matter, and throughout the term, the
teacher is hard pressed and finally unable to locate this student on any spectrum of
acceptable discourse and decides that he cannot pass his work. However brilliant in other
ways, the boy simply does not fit in, nor fit the mold of common sensibility grounded in
the factual discourse of learning and life. His work is eventually consigned to a discard
pile of student failures. There is a tragic context in the telling of this story which would
take us aside from the limited point of our interest here which is to note the standard of
autobiography in the listing of facts and events in standard categories of social
accountability.
In contrast to this factual encasement the emerging literature of the feminine
movement has produced new voices that have found a different way to shape the
possibilities of autobiography more in keeping with the complexities of our changing life
stories. In this literature a life-story can well begin at any point that constitutes a
significant sense of its coherence and importance, nor is one limited to a single starting
point or narrative. One might begin a story of her life: ‗I was abandoned by my
parents...‘ and so a life narrative unfolds in terms of that critical perception and
experience. But at another juncture, or just as well, this autobiography may be
transformed along with the life of its telling: ‗I first met my birth mother on my
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graduation from middle school…‘ Where one starts is critical for the narrative,
obviously, and also critical for the life of its telling, but that place is not assigned by any
objective order in terms of its importance or the coherence of the narrative. Language is
a tool for many purposes, and the meaning of a life cannot be determined independently
of the story in which it is framed; to the extent that there are optional narratives, there
exist also different life possibilities. No one is stuck with one set of determining facts, no
matter how hard the circumstances of her life.
In a world fast losing its tether to religious conviction, moral objectivity, universal
reason, political solvency, ecological sensibility…it may be that all we have left are
stories to replace the once endowed gods, the enshrined templates of True, Good,
Beautiful, Sacred…except of course that the gods and these various testaments were all
and in themselves stories and the products of stories. Hopefully we can avoid
succumbing to any insistence that there is only one way to see the world (e.g. physics),
one way to consider life (biology), as once people were persuaded or forced to think there
was but one God –their own (theology.) I trust it is not necessary to note here that this is
in no way to dismiss the importance of any particular story—e.g. physics or biology—or
to debunk any efforts to assess truth, goodness, or the sacred. This is only to suggest that
the meaning and value of any discourse is related to the context of the stories being told.
Our lives individually and collectively are comprised of stories in which events
are recorded, interpreted, evaluated, edited, but also in which possibilities,
disappointments, alternatives, dreams, regrets, hopes are woven into the narrative;
occasionally, our experiences may be sufficiently shaken by joy or sorrow such that a
whole paradigm shifts in the narrative. It is in this sense that historical fabulations
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surround our most ordinary lives, extend and inform the range of our possibilities as
human beings.
We are in fact not bound by facts. If we have a nature, it is one that we have
given to ourselves in some accepted story or other and which remains ever a work in
progress. Does this mean there are no facts that form the boundaries of life and world?
No, only that the facts in our lives are first of all dependent on the meaning of our
experience—individually and collectively, existentially and historically—in its myriad
forms and flaws; it is only in this flexible and variable way that the meaning of our lives
is ever ‗determined by the facts.‘
What I am arguing for, then, is more a plea for the centrality of metaphor in
language (Logos) and of imagination in life—for the possibilities embedded in a living
language that is addressed to the comprehensive if indeterminate richness and complexity
of human existence. To put it in another way the division of Logos from Mythos and the
related genders of language that estrange and hermetically seal facts from the reach of
fiction and fantasy must be reconciled in order to create the life stories in which we find
meaning.
II
True stories: some say that in the beginning there was a great void and out of
Chaos came Desire and Destiny and the ensuing generation of first things. Others say
that in the beginning darkness covered the earth but the creator brought forth light and
knelt down in its early mist to breathe life into the clay. Still others say that in the first
three seconds of the universe there was a cosmic mix of mass and energy that generated
life. Like most autobiographies, the self-life-writing of human-being can begin at any
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particular moment that is memorable or that the retrospective mind finds especially
compelling. Some picture human life to be that of a naked ape whose existence in the
world of his own making is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Others imagine that
of one race are gods and men. The story seems to depend on where and when the teller,
and what the point of telling or taleing. But no story holds title to truth for, of course, the
story itself is in process, the subject in transit, the end in question.
We attribute to the writers in the age of Classical Greece, particularly the critical
historians and philosophers, the intuition that it was important to get things right, to give
reasons and argue for perspectives about the name and nature of Man. It is not
uncommon to suppose that in the gradual transformation of mythos into logos—of
emergent sense into manifest truth—that we have left well behind as vestigial myth the
primal energy and spiritual core of generative stories. But to think so is a mistake.
History is still a story, allegory survives at the heart of philosophical discourse and
metaphor generates invention at the base and boundaries of scientific inquiry. Mythos
remains subliminally operative and functionally transformative in the living culture of the
storytelling animal whose very life blood is possibility.
Still, we would like to get it right; indeed the literal bias of the modern temper
rather insists on it, but we must trace back this particular obsession to its archaic source
in wonder if we are to understand its nature and risk. Arguably, the first point of critical
separation of the mythic and historical, the factive from the fictive, is found in the
development of ‗the Socratic Method.‘ The Platonic Dialogues mark the distinctive turn
to an insistence on rational discourse as the touchstone of value and this also allegedly
marks the fatal fracturing of reason and passion in philosophical inquiry. However, we
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will try to discern in this most enigmatic of the triumvirate of Classical Greek
philosophers the more fundamental and sustaining resource of mythic energy that keeps
open the possibilities of human imagination. Further developing the counsel of Socrates
and framing the paidaeic project of Aristotle, Plato‘s poetic dialogues contain
countervailing and contrapuntal elements of both mythos and logos. It is the
philosophical convergence of discursive logistics and dramatic erotics which make his
work such a compelling study of Man as a changeling creature caught-between.
Throughout the Platonic corpus there are countless instances and uses of myth,
allegory, and extended metaphor imbedded within the discursive logic of his Dialogues
A long history of scholarship has argued the point and import of Plato‘s wide and
effective use of what otherwise and in the context of his valuations he seems to dismiss as
nonsense or insidious. Should we believe what he says against what he does? The
rhetorical, dramatic, and figurative uses of myth are so obviously deliberate and
intentionally integrated such that they cannot be dismissed as incidental accessories. So
what then are we to make of the fabulations of Plato in the midst of the serious business
of a search for truth? It is one thing to credit the great tragic dramatists with imaginative
license and emotive excesses in the search for the darker reaches of the pathological in
human perversions, marking the territory of That Way Be Dragons. But et tu Plato?
How and why myth and to what end in the larger body of his work?
I want to look briefly at one of Plato‘s Dialogues, more precisely at two sections
of the Symposium, which I take to be a crucial index of what the thinker was about in his
task of truth-telling concerning the nature and destiny of human kind. I suspect it is more
usual to think of the Symposium as a derivative, supplemental, or even incidental relief
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text in the Platonic corpus, rather than generative for the whole of his systematic inquiry
into Truth, Wisdom, and the Form of the Good. But the erotic genesis of inquiry is the
whole point of the text of this dialogue and as such marks the conceptual beginning of
Plato‘s central project of achieving a synoptic vision of reality.
Of the two myths to be discussed in Plato‘s Symposium one is familiar and oftcited (the speech of Aristophanes), the other is more complex and variously interpreted
(the dialectical teaching of Diotima). Both occur in the context of a gathering of friends
to celebrate the victory of a tragic dramatist during the festival of Dionysos. The evening
is given to drinking and conversation, and an invitation is given to each person to address
an encomium to Love. In Aristophanes‘ speech, Plato has the great comic dramatist relate
a fabulous myth which depicts the human condition as one driven by desire resulting
from a radically divided soul in which the separate parts are condemned to search the
world for completion and fulfillment by reuniting with its other half. Characteristically,
the effect of Aristophanes‘ myth is a deep mix of comic pathos. The original rotund
creatures possessed of two heads, four arms, four legs, etc., were so aggressive,
obnoxious, and threatening that the god split them in half—creating a vast community of
half-life beings whose plaintive existence is driven by an obsession to recover their whole
identity through the other. Given the great plurality of people and expanse of the world,
and given the complexities of ordinary human association along with the risk and pain of
experimental intimacy, the prospect of reconciliation is not optimal. At root this
fabulation has the telling truth and compelling reality of common human experience. If
Socratic wisdom consists in striving the whole of our lives so that the end of all our
striving will be to return to where we began and know the place for the first time—that is,
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if the journey of the intellect is for the mind to come to understand what in some
important and archaic sense it already knows, then this myth represents an important
parallel with respect to the journey of the heart. There is in each person a life-long
striving to arrive whence we began, and there is the hope that if we are fully alive,
sensitive and open to the risks of desire, then we may finally come to ourselves in simple
fulfillment of the nature of our existence. However poignant the human situation seems
under Aristophanes‘ comic tale, there is promise as well—a further analogue to the myth
of human discord that placed hope in the bottom of Pandora‘s Box.
The series of encomia to love in the Symposium predictably reflect the character
of each speaker and further index the relation each has to this most intimate and binding
phenomenon of social existence. Recall that the series begins with a speech in praise of
that first impulse of desire in the journey toward beauty and truth: the physical attraction
to the body of the ‗other.‘ But in terms of Aristophanes‘ interpretive myth this means
that we are drawn out of ourselves toward ourselves. Each speech expands the domain
and level of this impulse, in which Love, Desire, Eros, is depicted variously as a young
playful and vigorous god, as a great benevolent god of age and wisdom, as the most
beautiful of gods…until it is the turn of the old satyr Socrates. Subsequent to
Aristophanes‘ account, and leading up to Socrates‘ interrogatories, the host and honoree
of the symposium, the new and victorious playwright Agathon, flushed with victory,
pictures the god in his own image, as if he were looking into a mirror for a likeness. One
is reminded of Nietzsche‘s remark about one loving that in which they find their own
strength. It remains for Socrates to lift the discourse to embrace the whole of humanity.
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III
The love and pursuit of wisdom in its most general as opposed to professionally
philosophical sense is a journey without a destination. As such the journey itself a
fabulation of human sensibility—desire in search of its ground, the soul in search of its
sense and limits. Its object is the subject itself. The Greeks analyzed desire as a lack, as
an immediate and compelling sense of incompleteness, and as such at the heart and
impulse of all movement. It is significant that Plato places the mythic account of desire
at the root of human endeavor in the character and voice of the comic poet, who begins in
a playful and vulgar style in keeping with his reputation. The burlesque gives way
however to a more somber rendition of desire in human longing for a soul mate that will
reconcile the divided self. Recalling why Zeus split in two the strident creatures of the
originating species, there is reason to question the wisdom of any reunion. However
poignant the plight of the human being so divided, this reminder of what a permanent
reconciliation would restore in the form of the two headed many armed monster suggests
the human being is a finer and nobler creature when caught up in the infinite and insistent
space of desire. This sense of the incompleteness of human endeavor is familiar
characteristic of the eristic activity and aporetic discourse of the early ‗Socratic‘
dialogues, but it is true also in the more ambitious epistemic extensions of the later
dialogues. There is, for example, a characteristic lack of closure even in the Republic
when the question is put at the end of the long discussion, looking back on the
constructed ideal system of rational order of human community ‗But how and when will
all this come to pass…?‘ To which Plato has Socrates respond ―Not until philosophers
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become kings and kings philosophers.‖ In both conceptual and historical terms, this must
mean something like ‗When hell freezes over.‘ A reconciliation of ideas and the framing
of ideals is one thing, but human life fraught with desire is something quite other, and
Plato again counters the idyllic rationality of the Republic as well as the exacting
epistemic but still incomplete efforts at birthing knowledge in the Theaetetus with the
great dialogue and dialectic of desire in the Symposium.
The lesson of the Symposium in the larger body of Plato‘s work suggests that the
rational framing of the instrumentality and power of Logos requires an associated
discourse of Mythos, and a generative base of Eros. Reason and passion, inference and
inclination, deduction and desire are always in play if not in concert. Aristotle confirms
this same point in his founding insight that wisdom begins in wonder. He includes what
amounts to a cosmic addendum that acknowledges desire at the root of all things—that
the principle of all motion is attraction. In the different context and concern of the
Symposium, the teaching of Diotima is that only the gods remain unchanged: in mortals
attributes pass away and age, but they leave behind a new generation of possibilities that
enable mortal life a share in immortality.
Plato‘s efforts to circumscribe the limits of desire on the positive side, that is, at
the highest reach of intelligence and imagination, invariably meet with a discursive
aporia at which point he resorts to the dramatic figuration of myth, metaphor and
allegory. Although Plato was patently hostile to the use of fabulation and provided
extended critiques of differing orders against the various arts and their disfiguring
conceits, he nonetheless found it necessary to supplement and contextualize his vision of
human aspiration and achievement in figurative terms. Many of these dramatic vignettes
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have made their way into the canon of world literature quite apart from the abstract
corpus of Plato‘s philosophical work. The most famous is likely the ‗Allegory of the
Cave‘, from the Republic, which is sufficiently well known not to require detailed
description here. The fabulation of this allegory is first of all a portrait of the human
condition as an imprisonment of the senses. The world into which we awaken is a life
buried in the deep cave of a shadowland in which phenomena play across a dimly lit
cavern and knowledge is limited to guessing the sequence of their occurrence. Shackled
to this world of shadows in a flickering and false light of enfeebled perception, the
ambitions of relational desire is limited to cleverness, where prizes are awarded to those
who provide the most persuasive story of sequencing. This allegory is usually read in
epistemic terms as a figurative framing of Plato‘s theory of knowledge, one that requires
the transcendence of phenomenal appearance toward an ideal world of enlightenment
independent of the senses. So considered, it serves as a dramatic analogue to Plato‘s
discursive explication of ascendance to the realm of intelligibility in the equally famous
theory of the divided line. Our interest in this essay, however, will remain with the
developmental issue of desire and with the apparently necessary discourse of fabulations
through which the nature of desire finds adequate expression.
At the basic erotic level the crudity of desire demands immediate gratification in a
physical object, a raw craving for the other. In the Symposium this level consists in an
enflamed desire for the body of a beautiful youth. In the corresponding allegorical
context of the Cave, however, it is clear that such an appeal leaves desire in possession of
an empty husk, the faint satisfaction of an embracing shadow. Plato‘s cave and its
shadow-world recalls the Underworld of Homer, in which the wandering Odysseus meets

14

the shade of great Achilles who soon disabuses him of any notion that power, authority or
prestige exist among the faded creatures of Hades. Desire is empty in such regions,
whether in Hades or among the idle and vacant distractions of a world devoid of
transcendence. At the same time, however, Plato makes clear that it is in the visceral
commonplace of craving that one discovers in oneself the base stirrings of a desire. It is
through effort and direction that this primitive desire becomes the aspiration of wisdom—
a desire which, taken root, transforms the self and the world it inhabits.
Plato‘s measured constraint in this initial position is to insist that from any level
of apprehension deserving the name ―humanity‖ it makes little difference whether the
movement is that of an organism above or a shade below: fulfillment is hollow without a
transcendent aspiration of desire. The life journey from out of the cave is not only
toward cognitive enlightenment, but one in search of moral and emotional maturity.
Once free of the shackles of immediacy, desire effects a transformation of intellect and
imagination toward the soul‘s fulfillment. It is convenient to mark the stages of this
ascendancy of desire in the lexicon of Love within classical Greek literature in terms of
libidos (the first and sustaining movement of life energy) through Eros (the cathecting
immediacy of desire on available objects) to philein (recognition of the mediating
reciprocity of the desire of others) to agape (the fulfillment of desire in realization of
human possibility.) This characterization of the growth and maturation of desire which is
developed in the Symposium is a moral and emotional analogue to the wisdom of human
aspiration that begins in the movement out of the cave into the light in Plato‘s Republic.
So who and what is this creature that struggles out of the cocoon of the senses,
who emerges from a primitive encapsulation and begins its journey to overcome the
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remnants of its birthing? Plato‘s answer is to describe a philosophical animal, one whose
realization of desire gradually transforms a world of contingency and necessity into a
realm of freedom and beauty—a creature that in transforming its environment transforms
itself.
Plato‘s metaphor for this changeling creature is that of pregnancy: a human being
is a creature of desire whose manifest destiny in wisdom is to give birth in beauty. The
characteristic figure in this process is Socrates as midwife as described in the Theaetetus.
This self-description and model of the teacher is confirmed throughout the Platonic
corpus, in which we discover Socrates assisting others both in finding a source of the
beautiful and of assisting in the birthing and examination of the created offspring. In the
Theaetetus, it is argued that while all men are pregnant, not all are ready for the labor that
will bring forth promising offspring. Even the most earnest among those who labor bring
forth wind-eggs and become discouraged in their passion.
The Symposium gives an account of the origin and development of this idea of
birthing, and this once again requires the figuration of the fabulous: males are pregnant
and laboring to give birth, seeking a transcendence not only of the prison of the senses
but of the time of their tenure in the world. The point of all pregnancy, as explained in
the concluding wisdom of Diotima, is immortality—either through the natural physical
begetting of children, or through the intellectual and imaginative creation of immortal
thoughts, deeds, or works.
IV
That Plato was ever in search of truth and reality is not in question, of course, but
it is also the case that in order to do this he must construct a world in which his former
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teacher appears throughout as a protagonist of mythic proportions. No less an authority
than Shelley, who translated the Symposium, refers to the poetic structure of the Platonic
corpus in his essay on the Defense of Poetry arguing that Plato was essentially a poet
such that the truth and splendor of his imagery are matched by the melody of his
language. Shelley claims to be following Plato in holding that the exercise of every
imaginative art is poetry. His further thesis in a famous and often contested passage is
that poets who imagine the indestructible order of beauty are more than authors of
language, music and painting but are also founders of civil society and inventors of the
arts of life. Shelley‘s claim that poets become teachers by drawing near to the beautiful
and true reflects his general understanding of Plato‘s work grounded in the force of the
poetics of the Symposium.
There is reason to believe that the historical Socrates, as he remarks in his own
words in the Phaedo, is not a mythologist, not a ‗teller of stories‘. His basic attitude was
critically opposed to the fancy of poetic conceit, and the purpose of his inquiry essentially
aporetic—to bring discourse only to the point of its limits. Not so Plato; although he
burned his tragedies when he took up philosophy at the death of Socrates he retained a
poetic sense for the importance of the mythic in his development of the genre of
philosophical drama. The major emphasis of his work is committed to transcendence
toward a synoptic vision of reality, which could not be fully developed within the
logistical constraints of argumentative discourse. Plato is more than a creator of
particular contextual myths. His incorporation of the mythic begins and is sustained
through his depiction of Socrates—a character of mythic proportions who is a fusion of
logos and mythos, ethos and pathos. Among the countless fabulations of Socrates
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throughout Plato‘s Dialogues perhaps the most important for our purposes is found in the
closing sequence of the Symposium. In a mock encomium to the god of love, the drunken
interloper Alkibiades likens Socrates to the Sileni, the seduction of his words having the
same effect as the flute playing of the demon Marsyas. That Socrates is here and
throughout depicted as an erotic force comparable to the fabled satyr of Dionysian
passion is evidence of Plato‘s commitment to revitalize the tradition of myth that was
being displaced from the literature of his time. Euripides‘s dismissal of myth from the
Dionysian ritual of drama in favor of common characters and ordinary life signaled an
end to the tradition and depth of the tragic vision once achieved in Aeschylus and
Sophocles. In its place Plato offers a new mythic genre that provides a conceptual and
creative base to revitalize the possibilities inherent in the metaphysical depth of tragic
drama. Although Plato no longer probes the darkness of the human soul characteristic of
tragedy, his dialectical drama draws on the residual depths of the earlier drama. The
Platonic Dialogue neither rivals nor replaces the great tradition of the tragic dramatists,
but as evidenced in the Symposium, it does transform into a new key a human drama
grounded in passion.
In the Symposium Plato constructs a variegated account of the strange creature
Eros in such a way to mirror the various mythic images of the satyr figure of Socrates.
Neither god nor man, the daemon Eros is the child of Poros and Penia—an offspring of
the coupling of affluence and poverty; he is, in the solemn description of the priestess
Diotima, rough and disheveled, without house or shoes one who sleeps in the open streets
and alleys of the world. However, he was conceived during the birthday celebration of
Aphrodite so he is a lover of beauty and a pursuer of good, and thus a driving force in the
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relations and aspirations of human beings toward virtue and wisdom. Neither Eros, love
nor Socrates, teacher possess the good, the true, or the beautiful, but they are so disposed
in nature that they aspire to these things, and in so doing inspire others to do the same.
We are thus given the condition of human-being as divided and infused with need and
longing, but having manifest possibility, pregnant with the prospect of great thoughts and
deeds needing only to be brought forth in beauty. The journey of man is always toward
the fulfillment of this possibility—the birthing of human excellence through the love of
another.
The self is divided in its very nature throughout Plato‘s range of mythic images.
The description in the Republic is the familiar political myth of human soul as tripartite,
composed of intellect, spirit, and appetite. Later in that same work Plato constructs a
fabulation fashioned after the mythic beasts of the Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus. This
image of the soul is the mythic figure of a three headed beast or rather three beasts joined
together ‗naturally‘: the first a multicolored beast with a ring of man-heads that grow and
change at will, the second beast that of a lion, and the last in the figure of an ordinary
human being, the composite given the outward features of the latter. In the Republic,
Plato‘s subject is the just soul, and his analysis here is that the manifest soul will be
determined by which of the beasts are fed and nurtured—if the first two are favored and
the last neglected or starved then the different parts of the beast will devour and kill one
another. To achieve a harmony of soul, clearly the human intellect must make the
courage and strength of the lion an ally in order to control and domesticate the many
appetites of the multiform beast of the passions.
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The nature of the soul for Plato is movement; the virtue of the immortal soul is
life. Prior to its incarnation the soul, as it is pictured in the Phaedrus, is winged and feeds
on the pure forms of the true and the good, but incarnated in human form it is weighed
down in visceral accessories and torn by good and bad desires. In yet another tripartite
image this soul is depicted in terms of a charioteer with a team of horses, one good, one
bad. The soul is attracted, as in the Symposium first to the sight of a beautiful youth,
which brings to mind the idea and ideal of beauty itself. The soul takes wing at the
aspect of beauty but there ensues a struggle between the two horses, between the base and
higher impulses of passion. The task of the charioteer is to bring the team into harmony
of action and aspiration. It is clear that neither love nor beauty alone will satisfy the need
of the soul for fulfillment, but also that both the carnal and the spiritual impulses of the
soul remain active in its journey.
The detail and stages of this journey is the subject text of the Symposium and the
capstone of that dialectical discussion is the teaching of Diotima in which she instructs
the young Socrates on love. She teaches that the object of love is not beauty, as many
think, it is birth. Procreation is the closest things mortals can get to immortality. At this
most basic level of generative desire, Diotima explains that its source is not reason, for
animals too are seized by desire and will sacrifice everything to protect their offspring.
Mortal nature itself is locked into an imperative to overcome mortality. If wisdom is to
achieve birth in beauty then clearly its object is immortality
Even where the question of a Dialogue is more narrowly directed to
epistemology—the nature of knowledge rather than love or wisdom—the imperative of
desire is still present. Socrates is depicted in the Theaetetus as a midwife assisting in the
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labor of bringing to birth the truth that is in each person, a truth through which one
participates in immortality if only for the moment its realization. The sole resource for
this birthing is the reproductive capacity to constantly replace the past generation with a
new one. An individual is constantly renewed and constantly losing other qualities. Plato
observes that no characteristics, traits, beliefs, desires, delights, troubles or fears ever
remain the same. And it is the same with knowledge: it comes and goes, is manifest and
is replaced. Despite Plato‘s modal paradigm of form, clearly he acknowledges here the
more fundamental flow of reality in our perception of human life and world.
V
The question finally is why a master dialectician like Plato who insisted that all
values be rational resorts to fabulation. The simple answer is that the human creature and
its world at issue is itself fabulous. Any adequate description of the changeling whose
mortal nature is freedom and whose passion is immortality cannot be circumscribed in
any but mythic idioms. Implicit in Nietzsche‘s insight that the genius of classical Greek
drama was its celebration of both gods, Dionysos and Apollo, is the parallel notion that
no culture can be fully alive to human possibility that has lost its sense of myth I am
suggesting, however, that Nietzsche is wrong to dismiss Plato from attending the shrines
of these gods, albeit in a different way from the tragic dramatists. We have already noted
Plato‘s engagement and extension of the mythic tradition through the various forms of
metaphor and fabulation. The seminal nature of Eros in the Symposium that frames the
rest of his work indicates Plato‘s broader though seldom acknowledged recognition of the
tensions of Logos and Mythos at the heart of his dialectic. The extent and importance of
fabulation in Plato‘s work makes it clear that his rational dialectic should be regarded
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also as a passionate journey that embraces the creative fissions and fusions that fully
constitute human reality.
If philosophy remains rooted in the pursuit of wisdom, then it must track and trace
the machinations of imagination that frame the always-to-be-determined nature of the
forever divided creature that would be god. The trick in discerning this fabulous beast is
not to domesticate its prodigious achievements but also to celebrate the imaginative reach
and the splendor of its failings. To do this, philosophy must reconnect with the mythic
tradition kept alive in the poetry of the world‘s great literature.
To say that the human-being of the creature caught between is undetermined is in
moral terms to acknowledge that its nature is freedom. In Sartre‘s expression it is not
what it is, and is what it is not. The language of fabulation allows for the loosening of the
logistical binds that traditionally have fixed the nature of this transformational enigma.
The cultural convergence of the various allegedly rival discourses of ethics politics,
economics, biology and theology attests to the dominant tradition that seeks to delineate
the defining limits of this changeling creature. But each completed tapestry of culture
includes a ghostline to the literature of fabulation. The mythic impulse in literature must
continue to search for resonance with the uncanny, the surreal, and those existential
fragments of imagination that bear witness to the flow of reality beneath the form of
conjecture. The fictive discourse of fabulation keeps alive the Dionysian impulse that
resists fixation and keeps faith with an alternative discourse in which the understanding
of human being is enriched under the aspect of exception.
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